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Afghanistan - Parlamentsvalg, september 2005Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?ICG (International Crisis Group), 21. juli 2005 Asia Report No. 101 Uddybende situations-rapport med anbefalinger fra International Crisis Group før Parlaments-valg og Regional-valg i Afghanistan i september. Valget til Afghanistans første demokratiske repræsentativt valgte parlament kan blive første skridt henimod en politisk stabilisering af Afghanistan, men en lang række forhold vil komme til at spille en måske afgørende rolle. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Elections for Afghanistan's National Assembly and Provincial
Councils are a critical opportunity to achieve a sustainable peace in a country
that is still emerging from a quarter century of conflict, created and
exacerbated by ethnic, sectarian, regional and linguistic divisions. A
representative and functional National Assembly could prove a crucial step in
stabilising Afghanistan by allowing diversity of voices in decision-making.
Provincial Councils could also help extend the authority of central government
by introducing legally approved layers of devolution. But the September polls will only succeed in stabilising
Afghanistan's political transition if the elections are for institutions with
properly defined roles and responsibilities; if the electoral system enables a
true reflection of popular will; if the election process, including registration
and vote counting is properly run; and if overall security is sufficient to
allow for as free and fair a contest as possible in a country which still bears
the scars of civil war. In the 2004 presidential polls, Afghans had demonstrated
immense enthusiasm for the political transition despite formidable security and
other challenges. Preparations for these more complex elections are, however,
set against a backdrop of electoral delays and neglect for the future
institutions that will emerge. Institutions. Little groundwork has been laid for
legislative or locally devolved bodies. Instead all the eggs of state have been
put in the basket of one man, the chief executive, President Hamid Karzai.
Indeed the political environment created over three and a half years of the
transitional process must call into question the ability of the new
representative bodies to have a real voice in the future of Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is to proceed on the path to stability,
President Karzai's government and the international community will have to
urgently build the new legislature's capacity. Defining the roles and the
responsibilities of the Provincial Councils must become a priority for the
National Assembly. And just weeks before elections are due, all stakeholders
must collectively strive to make the process a success. Electoral System. Instead of empowering political
parties, essential for a successful political transition, Karzai's hostility has
only added to their difficulties. The new Electoral Law -- not released until
May, which excludes the use of party symbols on ballot papers, has undermined
nascent democratic groupings, while old jihadi networks continue to have access
to power and resources. The multi-member constituency Single Non-Transferable
Voting (SNTV) system also works against new political parties that are, as yet,
incapable of the sophisticated strategising and discipline needed to translate
popular support into electoral victories. By encouraging appeals to narrow
ethnic interests rather than broad-based constituencies, the electoral system
could result in the absence of workable caucuses within the new National
Assembly, further raising fears about the seeds of future instability. Election Process. This has been marred so far by the
lack of strategic planning on the part of the United Nations and the Afghan
government. The two parts of the process that the Bonn Agreement specifically
earmarked for the UN -- a pre-poll census and a voters' registry -- have been
amongst the least satisfactory. This lack of planning has held these polls
captive to a tight six-month timetable. And technical needs rather than the
political aspirations of the Afghan people continue to drive preparations.
Ballot production and distribution have received more time than the vetting of
candidates in a land where numerous unpunished atrocities have taken place.
Widespread civic education, essential given the lack of democratic experience,
only got underway once the electoral process had begun. Hundreds of thousands of
Afghan refugees who took part in the presidential poll are likely to be
disenfranchised for reasons of cost and convenience. Despite the shortcomings of the electoral process, there are
also some signs of hope. The Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat (JEMBS),
overseeing the election process, is pushing ahead with the hand it has been
dealt and driving technical preparations for infinitely more complex polls at a
faster pace than during the lead up to the presidential poll. Over 5,000 candidates might make every stage of the
preparations harder through sheer numbers, but these impressive numbers also
demonstrate continued public interest in creating an Afghanistan where the
ballot prevails, not the gun. Tight electoral timelines place more emphasis on getting the
work done, rather than capacity building. But some attention is finally being
turned to the sustainability of electoral institutions and future polls. In the
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and Provincial Election Commissions (PECs),
the country has important new electoral bodies in place. Security. Yet heightened insecurity continues to
pose one of the gravest challenges to free and fair elections. In recent months
anti-government activity, particularly cross-border attacks from Pakistan, has
been on the rise, and election workers have been attacked. With multiple
provincial contests, these elections may well see an increase in factional
violence as local power structures are challenged and, in some cases, long-term
rivals put in direct competition. Much of this could take place after the
announcement of results as the new political landscape creates winners and
losers. These elections thus stand as both a testing ground and
incentive for a number of on-going programs to build security. These include the
disarmament of both official and unofficial armed groups; the expansion of the
Afghan National Army (ANA); the professionalisation of the Afghan National
Police (ANP); as well as reform of the judicial system and imposition of the
rule of law. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
program, aimed at officially recognised armed groups, has moved some 60,000 men
out of the security equation and the ANA can also be seen as an embryonic
success, adding to stability on polling day and beyond. Other processes,
including the disbanding of Illegal Armed Groups (IAG) have, however, lagged
behind. District and provincial governors, along with local police also remain a
major source of intimidation, largely because of a failure, thus far, to
professionalise the police and to rid local administrations of corrupt
individuals. While electoral vetting cannot substitute for a transitional
justice process, a disappointing level of prudence over political will prevailed
in assessing candidate eligibility, allowing many responsible for human rights
abuses to contest the polls. Both the Karzai administration and its
international supporters must recognise that the pursuit of stability and an end
to impunity should proceed in tandem. The government must also ensure that the
backroom deal-making which allowed some commanders to keep their place on the
ballot in exchange for undertakings of ongoing disarmament is zealously followed
up. As largely trusted actors, the international security forces
in Afghanistan will have to play a particularly crucial role in providing
security and building trust before, during, and after the elections. However,
the slow pace of extending a robust peacekeeping presence outside Kabul during
the transitional period has allowed regional commanders to entrench themselves.
Indeed, instability, combined with a climate of impunity, could undermine the
electoral process. Building a secure environment to allow people to confidently
exercise their secret vote and to react quickly to factional fighting in the run
up to, during and after the polls, should be the focus of attention for both
national and international military forces. But, above all, preparations for the new representative
institutions should be urgently accelerated if they are to have a real voice and
not descend into chaos and paralysis. Within Afghanistan a multiplicity of
voices needs to be heard in setting future development and other pressing
priorities, ending the historic intolerance of political opposition. The international community too must not regard the polls
simply as a convenient exit strategy. These historic polls stand closer to the
beginning than the end of Afghanistan's political transition. History has
already shown the catastrophic consequences of allowing the Afghan state to
wither. As the transitional period comes to an end, the Karzai government and
the international community must commit themselves to ensuring that Afghanistan
and its citizens can continue to follow the path of a sustainable peace. RECOMMENDATIONS To the Karzai Government: 1. Foster security and voter
confidence by:
2. Better prepare for the new
institutions by:
3. Ensure some representation for
refugees through presidential appointees to the Meshrano Jirga; this should be
preceded by extensive pre-election consultations by the Ministry of Refugees and
Returnees. 4. Continue the vetting process
by having new members of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils sign
legally binding affidavits before taking their seats, attesting that they had
not been involved in any criminal activities, human rights abuses, or the
narcotics trade. 5. Develop the capacity of the
Independent Election Commission (IEC) and assist it in devising the framework
for future elections by:
To the Joint Electoral Management
Body (JEMB) and the Independent Election Commission: 6. Help build greater public
awareness and candidate recognition by extending the formal campaign period
through the remaining two months and abolish restrictive campaign rules. 7. Call an urgent summit on civic
education, including regional representatives of the JEMB, NGO partners and
donor groups to assess progress and penetration. 8. Ensure transparency and
credibility on polling day by:
9. Immediately after the
elections build momentum for future polls by:
To the Electoral Complaints
Commission (ECC): 10. Create a climate of candidate
responsibility by:
11. Ensure adequate resources are
in place to enable proper examination of complaints, directly appealing to
donors where they are not. To the International Community: 12. Assist the election process
and the institutions it will create by:
13. Help foster security and
confidence by:
Kabul/Brussels, 21 July 2005 Downloads:
Click here to view the full report as a PDF file in A4 format.
Information about viewing PDF documents: Click here to get Adobe Acrobat Reader. The full report is also available in MS-Word format - Click here!
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